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Abstract  
Commodity MurābaÍah is an example of product innovation in Islamic banking and finance, 
which is based on MurābaÍah and Tawarruq transactions. Both traditional and the 
contemporary Islamic jurists hold different opinions on its legality in the light of Fiqh. This study 
is aimed at understanding of Commodity MurābaÍah trading especially the current practical 
operations and describing preferred structures of Commodities MurābaÍah as offered by Bursa 
Malaysia to overcome the highlighted controversies of SharīÑah issues. This paper will illustrate 
in detail the transactional flow of Bursa Sūq Al-SilaÑ as operated by Bursa Malaysia and will 
shed light on related SharīÑah issues for improvement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Bursa Malaysia or Malaysia Exchange, previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE)
1
 is an exchange holding company approved under Section 15 of the Capital Markets and 
Services Act 2007. In short, the Stock Exchange (Bursa Saham) is a capital market where quoted 
investments namely stocks
2
 and shares
3
 may change hands between buyers and sellers. The 
Stock Exchange in Malaysia was established based on the powers
4
 vested in the Minister of 
Finance. Its vision is to be the preferred partner in Asia for fund-raising, trading and investment. 
While its mission is as the preferred partner, Bursa Malaysia offers a fair and orderly market that 
is easily accessible with diverse and innovative products and services.  
 
Here, we shall get a clear picture on how crucial the functions of BSKL which contributes to 
economic growth. The main function of the BSKL is to control the work of its stockbroker 
members as well as to establish rules and regulations for the quotation of the listed companies. 
Despite provides a trading room where share prices are quoted daily, a meeting place provided 
especially for the representatives of all stockbroker members.
5
 
 
The Commodity MurābaÍah House (CMH)6 infrastructure which uses Crude Palm Oil (CPO) as 
the underlying commodity to facilitate Islamic financing based on the concept of MurābaÍah and 
tawarruq will be developed as a spot commodity market. MurābaÍah7 is essentially a form of 
trade credit, in which the bank actually purchases and becomes legal owner of whatever the 
client has ordered and then resells it to the client on deferred term payment, at a previously 
agreed, higher price. However, Commodity MurābaÍah concept which has been extensively 
                                               
1 In Malay it is called as Bursa Saham Kuala Lumpur (BSKL). 
2 Stock generally refers to securities with fixed interests and the issues are usually in block units. 
3 Shares are dividend paying capital, e.g. ordinary shares. A share is described as that portion of the owner‟s capital in 
business. See Singh, Biliwi, An Introduction to the Securities and Futures Industry in Malaysia, (Selangor: The 
Malaysian Current Law Journal Sdn. Bhd., 1990), pp.5. 
4 This power is derived from Section 8 of the Securities Industry Act 1983. Section 8(2) sets out the requirements that 
have to be met before the Minister approves the Exchange. See Singh, Biliwi, An Introduction to the Securities and 
Futures Industry in Malaysia, pp.11. 
5 Goh, Chen Chuan, Handbook on KLSE Second Board, (Kuala Lumpur: Leeds Publications, 1997), pp.7. 
6 Commodity MurābaÍah House (CMH) is aimed at facilitating liquidity management and the financing of Islamic 
financial and investment instruments.  
7 MurābaÍah based financial operations are practiced by Islamic financial institutions under such various names as 
mark up, cost plus financing, production support programs, short-term financing or even, simple, sale-purchase 
contract. 
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used in Bursa Malaysia is basically applying the contract of Tawarruq as well in its transactional 
flow. Tawarruq is assigned as a sale contract whereby a buyer buys an asset from a seller with 
deferred payment and subsequently sells the asset to the third party on cash with a price lesser 
than the deferred price, for the purpose of obtaining cash.
8
 Briefly, Tawarruq is used generally to 
refer to an arrangement whereby a person who was in need of cash bought some goods for 
deferred payment. Later, he sold the goods to another party (not the original seller) for cash 
payment of a lower price.
9
 The researcher shall therefore explore the issue of Commodity 
MurābaÍah which has triggered fiery debates among Muslim scholars from Fiqh perspective. 
 
SHARÔÑAH PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING MURĀBA×AH AND TAWARUQ IN 
COMMODITY MURĀBA×AH 
Islamic jurists as well as Islamic economists are almost unanimous that overwhelming use of 
Tawarruq as mode of financing, practically as an alternative to Commodity MurābaÍah is 
permissible in Islam. This paper will explore more on the nature of Commodity MurābaÍah as 
practiced by Islamic Financial Institution from the Fiqh perspective and outline the rationale of 
both its permissibility and impermissibility.  
 
MurābaÍah specifically tells the purchaser how much cost he has incurred and how much profit he 
is going to charge in addition to the cost.
10
 Therefore, in Islam, as long as it is clearly stated in the 
document as agreed by both parties on the profit that the bank is about to charge, then the 
transaction is permissible. 
 
Since Tawarruq is practiced widely in Commodity MurābaÍah, the researcher will elucidate the 
various opinions of Muslim Schools of Fiqh on the permissibility of tawarruq-based products 
                                               
8 Asyraf, Wajdi Dusuki, “Commodity MurābaÍah Programme (CMP): An Innovative Approach to Liquidity 
Management”. Paper published in Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, Volume 3, No.1; 2007,  pp.16. 
This definition is accepted by the OIC Fiqh Academy in their deliberation on the issue on 1st November 1998 (11 
Rejab 1419H). 
9 Ali, E. R. A. E., BayÑ al-ÑÔnah and Tawarruq: Mechanisms and Solutions. In Bank Negara Malaysia (Ed.), 
Mudhākarah Cendekiawan SharīÑah Nusantara 2006: BayÑ al-ÑInah dan Tawarruq: Isu-isu dan Penyelesaiannya 
Dalam Konteks Kewangan Islām, (Kuala Lumpur: Central Bank of Malaysia, 2007), pp.142. See also Al-Zuhayli, 
Wahbah, al-Fiqh al-Islāmī wa Adillatuhu, 3rd  ed., (Dimashq: Dar al-Fikr, 1989CE), v.4, pp.467-468. 
10 Bakar, Mohd Daud, Islamic Commercial Law for Bankers: Paper Workshop on Interest-Free Banking and Finance, 
(Kuala Lumpur: Dinamas Publishing, 1996), pp.21. 
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because obviously, Commodity MurābaÍah involves contract of Tawarruq. Briefly, Tawarruq is 
used generally to refer to an arrangement whereby a person who was in need of cash bought 
some goods for deferred payment. Later, he sold the goods to another party (not the original 
seller) for cash payment of a lower price.
11
 
 
The foregoing discussion on Commodities MurābaÍah involves different perception from both 
traditional and contemporary Muslim jurists on its legality in the light of Fiqh. Next, this paper 
shall discuss evidently any rationale or justification leads to its acceptance and rejection as 
Commodities MurābaÍah which practically using Tawarruq transaction in its operation is being 
widely used in Islamic financial institutions. 
 
PERMISSIBILITY OF TAWARRUQ 
In any economic transaction, everything is deemed permissible unless if there is an implications 
from the teachings either in the Al-Qur‟ān or Hadīth that forbids it, whether directly or 
indirectly. Islamic jurists as well as Islamic economists are almost unanimous that overwhelming 
application of Tawarruq as mode of financing, practically as an alternative to al-ÑÔnah is 
permissible in Islam. This paper presents the approaches in Fiqh in determining whether the 
contract is valid and permissible from SharīÑah perspectives. 
 
Precisely, both past jurists from Malikis and Hanbalis schools accepted Tawarruq.
12
 Thus, 
majority of the past jurists were inclined to allow Tawarruq on the basis that the parties intended 
to circumvent the prohibition of ribā was quite remote in Tawarruq due to its non-binding tri-
partite nature.  
 
However, this argument also concerned contemporary jurists who approved this transaction in 
the 15
th
 session of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Islamic Fiqh Academy conference, 
in September 1998, the Academy allowed the contract of Tawarruq as long as the customer 
doesn‟t sell the commodity to its original seller. Later in December 2003, in its 17th session, the 
                                               
11 Ali, E. R. A. E., opcit., pp.142. See also Al-Zuhayli, Wahbah, al-fiqh al-Islāmī wa adillatuhu, 3rd ed., (Dimashq: Dar 
al-Firk, 1989CE), v.4, pp.467-468. 
12 Al-Zuhayli, Wahbah, Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence, v.1, (Syria: Dar al-Fikr, 2003), pp.117. 
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Academy divided Tawarruq into Tawarruq Haqīqī (real tawaruq) which is permissible and 
Tawarruq MunaÐÐam or Tawarruq MaÎrafī (Organized Tawarruq) which is unacceptable 
because it is deemed to be synthetic and fictitious as BayÑ al-ÑÔnah a legal trick to circumvent the 
prohibition of ribāÒ.13  
 
Regardless of the objection of many jurists towards Organized Tawarruq, a few contemporary 
scholars have approved this practice even when the contract is being used in conjunction with an 
organised financing or investment facility offered by an Islamic financial institution
14
, such as 
the leading Saudi jurists, Syeikh Abdullah ibn Sulayman al-Mani‟15, Dr. Musa Adam Isa, Dr. 
Usamah Bahr and Dr. Sulaiman Nasir al-Ulwan.
16
 In fact, Syeikh Abdullah ibn Sulayman al-
Mani‟, considered Tawarruq as a suitable solution to overcome the problem of liquidity amongst 
the Muslims in a compliant manner.
17
 Although some jurists might still have disputation towards 
Organized Tawarruq, at least they are not as precariously controversial as BayÑ al-ÑÔnah. 
Indispensably, the need to find alternatives and solutions towards the dilemma of liquidity 
shortage is faced by Muslims in the whole Islamic countries.   
 
Furthermore, the justification of its permissibility to be used for liquidity management purposes 
is supported by both SharīÑah Advisory Council (SAC) of the Securities Commission of 
Malaysia and the SharīÑah Advisory Council of the Central Bank of Malaysia, in order to prevail 
over the problem of liquidity shortage in the country, without resorting to conventional ribā’-
based liquidity instruments and transactions which known as public interest consideration 
(maÎlaÍah).  
 
                                               
13 Asyraf, Wajdi Dusuki, opcit., pp.10. See also Ali, E. R. A. E., opcit., pp.142-144. 
14 Ali, E. R. A. E., opcit pp.144. See also Mani‟, „Abd Allah ibn Sulaiman, al-TaÑÎil al-fiqhi li al-tawarruq fÑ dauÑ al-
ihtiyājāt al-tamwilīyah al-muÑāÎirah, Majallah al-buhūth al-Islāmīyah 1425H, no:72, pp.351-382. 
15 Sheikh Abdullah ibn Sulayman al-Mani‟  is President of the courts of the Makkah Al Mukarramah by delegation and 
has been a member of the Senior Ulema Board since its inception. He was also Vice General President of Scientific, 
interpretation, call and guidance research Department.  He is a member of Shariah Supervisory Committees of various 
Banks in Saudi Arabia. He is Deputy Chairman of the Shariah Board of Accounting and Auditing Organisation of 
Islamic Financial Institutions. He has compiled a number of fatwas and has written many books on Islamic Banking. 
Indeed, he considered tawarruq as a suitable solution to overcome the problem of liquidity shortage in a compliant 
manner. See and Mani‟, „Abd Allah ibn Sulaiman, opcit., pp.579-582 and Ali, E. R. A. E., opcit., pp.144. 
16 Sheikh Sulaiman ibn Nasir al-Ulwan is known to be amongst the most influential scholars in the region of al-
Qaseem and he has written a number of books in the fields of fiqh and da'wah. 
17 Ali, E. R. A. E., opcit., pp.144. See also Mani‟, „Abd Allah ibn Sulaiman, opcit., pp.579-582. 
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The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) approves 
Tawarruq as long as the liquidity is performed for SharīÑah -complaint operations instead of 
interest-based lending.
18
  
 
It is submitted that there are six prerequisites of a valid contract in SharīÑah, namely the offeror 
and offerer; offer and acceptance; and the price and consideration.
19
 As for the subject matter of 
the contract in Commodities MurābaÍah, SharīÑah stresses on both the item and consideration 
the following matters i.e., lawfulness, existence, deliverability and precise determination. 
Lawfulness requires something which is permissible to trade, its subject matter (mahall) and 
underlying causes (sabab) must be lawful; it must neither proscribed by SharīÑah nor a nuisance 
to public order or morality, and the commodity must be legally owned by the parties to a 
contract.
20
  
 
Furthermore, the permissibility of Tawarruq Munazzam or Tawarruq Masrafi (Organized 
Tawarruq) is supported
21
 by both SharīÑah Advisory Council (SAC) of the Securities 
Commission of Malaysia and the SAC of the Central Bank of Malaysia for the public interest 
consideration (maÎlaÍah). The SAC of the Central Bank of Malaysia in its 51
st
 meeting held on 
28
th
 July 2005/ 21 Jamādil ÒAkhīr 1426 resolved that the deposit and financing product which 
applies the tawarruq concept is permissible.
22
 
 
In a nutshell, the researcher is convinced of the rationale of MurābaÍah being advanced by some 
interest-free institutions, as a business proposition especially in commodity trading which helps 
the establishment of economic growth. This paper is so much engrossed in highlighting 
controversial issues and arguments in transactional flow of Commodity MurābaÍah market and 
the trading itself which are finally proposed the preferable suggestions in handling those issues in 
accordance to SharīÑah.  
                                               
18 Kindly refer to AAOIFI standard No. 30, on the Mutawariq (Monetization Beneficiary), item 3/2, pp.535. 
19 Bakar, Mohd Daud, op.cit., pp.11. 
20 Ibid., pp.11. 
21 Here, Tawarruq MunaÐÐam or Tawarruq MaÎrafī (Organized Tawarruq) is supported to be used for liquidity 
management purposes to overcome the problem of liquidity shortage in the country, without resorting to conventional 
ribā-based liquidity instruments. 
22 Resolution of National SharīÑah Advisory Council of Central Bank of Malaysia, 2007, pg. 24. 
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Taken all into account, as far as Commodity MurābaÍah is concerned, the commodity must be 
permissible by SharīÑah determined precisely as to its essence, its quantity and its value.  
 
 IMPERMISSIBILITY OF TAWARRUQ 
Generally, SharīÑah has concluded that the unlawfulness of a transaction may be caused by any 
of the following factors;
23
 unlawful for its own sake (harām li dzātihi)24, unlawful due to an 
external reason (harām li ghaīrihi)25, or unlawful due to invalidity/ incompleteness26 of its 
underlying contract.  
 
Lately in the 19
th
 session of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Islamic Fiqh Academy 
conference, in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates the discussion was reiterated in April 2009 where 
this application has been banned by the Academy because simultaneous transactions occur 
between the financier and the mustawriq as it is considered a Íīlah (fictional device) concluded 
with a dubious transaction. Thus, in the resolution, OIC Islamic Fiqh Academy outlines that 
Islamic financial institution should avoid the instrument of Organised Tawarruq (Tawarruq 
MaÎrafī) as it deviates from the true objective of SharīÑah and contains the element of ribāÒ as 
the issue of prohibition the ribāÒ is mentioned largely in specific verses of the Qur‟ān27 as it 
leads to disparity and inequitable of wealth distribution between rich and poor.  
 
Thus, the main justification for the rejection of Tawarruq MunaÐÐam or Tawarruq MaÎrafī is that 
its mechanism resembles BayÑ al-ÑÔnah, which is frowned upon by some as a form of Íīlah (legal 
                                               
23 Karim, Adiwarman A, Islamic Banking: Fiqh and Financial Analysis, 3rd ed., (Jakarta: PT Raja Grafindo Persada, 
2005), pp.28. 
24 The transaction is impermissible because the transacted objects (good and/or services) are forbidden, e.g. alcoholic 
drinks, carcasses, pork etc. 
25 This transaction is violated due to two reasons. First, violation of the principle of “An Taraddin Minkum”. The state 
of being “unknown to one party” or concealing (tadlis) in any of the following 4 dimensions; quantity, quality, price 
and delivery time. Second, violation of the principle of “La taÐlimūn wa la tuÐlamūn” which means “inflict no evil, 
and be not inflicted by it.” Among the practices that violate this principle are taghrir (gharar), market frauds affecting 
the supply side (ikhtikar), market frauds affecting the demand side (bayÑ najasī), usury (ribāÒ), gambling (maysir), and 
bribery (risywah). See also Karim, Adiwarman A, opcit., pp.29-43. 
26 The transaction is still impermissible if it involves any of these factors; non-fulfillment of pillars (rukun) and 
condition (sharaÏ), occurrence of ta’alluq (occurs when one is faced with two related contracts, whereby the 
application of one contract hinges upon the other), or occurrence of “two in one” (shafqatain fi al-shafqah). 
27 Al-Qurān Al-Karīm, Al-Rūm (30):39, Al-Nisā‟ (4):161, Al-ÑImrān (3):130-132 and Al-Baqarah (2):275-281. 
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trick) and simply because it doesn‟t represent as Tawarruq Haqīqī (Real Tawarruq) which has 
been approved by the classical jurists.
28
 Some of the classical jurists, such as, „Umar ibn Abd al-
„Aziz and Muhammad al Shaybani chose to discourage (karāhah) the practice of Tawarruq. 
While Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim decided to prohibit the practice and dismissed it as a legal 
trick (Íiyāl) which is similar with BayÑ al-ÑÔnah.29  
 
In this light, Dr. Engku Rabiah Adawiyah Engku Ali in her writing argues that if Íiyāl is 
perceived as a mechanism to solve the pressing needs of people and society, and not being 
abused to the whims and fancies of the parties, then, there could be possibilities that the practices 
will be accepted as SharīÑah compliant alternatives. Moreover, there is neither reports nor 
narrations attributed to the Prophet (peace be upon him) disapproving the practice. Nevertheless, 
when Tawarruq becomes commercialized and utilized by the Islamic financial institutions to 
gain profits, Íīlah issue becomes arouse again when Majlis MajmaÑ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī rejected 
Tawarruq MaÎrafī.30 
 
OUTLINE OF COMMODITY MURĀBA×AH AND TAWARRUQ CONCEPTS IN BSKL 
As been discussed earlier in a previous chapter, in summary, Commodity MurābaÍah is a sale of 
specific commodities or goods at cost plus / mark-up on a deferred payment basis. Lately, 
Commodity MurābaÍah instrument based on Tawarruq concept, which has been introduced by 
Central Bank of Malaysia, is deemed as an innovative approach to liquidity shortage. 
 
As been reviewed earlier, Tawarruq is assigned as a sale contract whereby a buyer buys an asset 
from a seller with deferred payment and subsequently sells the asset to the third party on cash 
with a price lesser than the deferred price, for the purpose of obtaining cash. In BURSA KUALA 
LUMPUR, Commodity MurābaÍah which based on Tawarruq concept is being used in 
transactional flow of Commodity Market. The researcher will illustrate the business operational 
model of Commodity MurābaÍah as used by IFI in financing, deposit taking and sukūk 
                                               
28 Asyraf, Wajdi Dusuki, opcit., pp.10. 
29 Ali, E. R. A. E., opcit., pp.142. 
30 Ibid., pp.163. 
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issuance as explained by Mr. Norfadelizan Abdul Rahman
31
 during the interview session on 
30
th
 March 2010. 
 
 
SUMMARY ON BURSA SŪQ AL-SILAÑ 
In August 2009, Bursa Malaysia launched Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ, the world's first Internet 
commodities trading platform with crude palm oil (CPO) as its underlying asset that is SharīÑah 
compliant. Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ ( ىبرعلسلا قىس ةص ) is a commodity trading platform specifically 
dedicated to facilitate Islamic liquidity management and financing by Islamic banks. Embarked 
as a national project, Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ demonstrates the collaboration of Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM)
32
, the Securities Commission Malaysia (SC)
33
, Bursa Malaysia Berhad (Bursa Malaysia) 
and the industry players in support of the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre 
(MIFC)
34
 initiative. On the other hand, it receives closed co-operation and strong support of the 
Ministry of Plantation Industries and Commodities through the Malaysian Palm Oil Board 
(MPOB), Malaysian Palm Oil Association (MPOA) and Malaysian Palm Oil Council (MPOC). 
 
Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ ( ىبرعلسلا قىس ةص ) is designed to serve as a multi-commodity and multi-
currency platform, initially with trading of CPO to be followed by other SharīÑah approved 
commodities covering both soft and hard commodities to serve the Malaysian market. As we 
noticed, CPO is the launch commodity in Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ whereas its trading platform is fully 
                                               
31 Norfadelizan bin Abdul Rahman is the Head of Product Development, Islamic Capital Market of Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad. He is in charge of developing and innovating SharīÑah-compliant products and infrastructure for the 
Exchange. 
32 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) is the Malaysian central bank which its headquarters is located in Kuala Lumpur and 
it was established on 26th January 1959 to issue currency, act as banker and adviser to the Government and regulate the 
country's credit situation. The Bank reports to the Minister of Finance, Malaysia and keeps the Minister informed of 
matters pertaining to monetary and financial sector policies. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_Negara_Malaysia, 
accessed in 14th January 2010. 
33 The Securities Commission (SC) was established on 1st March 1993 as a statutory body entrusted with the 
responsibility of regulating and systematically developing the Malaysia's capital markets. The SC is to promote and 
maintain fair, efficient, secure and transparent securities and futures markets and to facilitate the overall development 
of an innovative and competitive capital market. See 
http://www.sc.com.my/main.asp?pageid=350&menuid=376&newsid=&linkid=&type, accessed in January 2010. 
34 MIFC was launched in August 2006 to promote Malaysia as a major hub for international Islamic finance. It 
comprises a community network of financial and market regulatory bodies, Government ministries and agencies, 
financial institutions, human capital development institutions and professional services companies that are 
participating in the field of Islamic finance. See http://www.mifc.com/index.php?ch=menu_exp&pg=menu_exp_ovr, 
accessed on 18th February 2010.  
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electronic and web-based via internet with multiple security features. Currently, trades will be 
Ringgit-denominated whilst efforts are being undertaken to make it multi currency capable, 
providing more choice, access and flexibility for international financial institutions to participate 
in this market.
35
 Thus, lets embrace timeless SharīÑah principles with the efficiency of 
technology, namely Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ which facilitates Islamic financial transactions and 
suitable for Islamic liquidity management and financial structure. It is a remarkable way to trade 
as it is operated by Bursa Malaysia‟s fully SharīÑah-compliant wholly-owned subsidiary Bursa 
Malaysia Islamic Services Sdn Bhd (BMIS), and as well it is deemed as an international spot 
commodity platform which facilitates commodity-based Islamic financing and investment 
transactions under the SharīÑah principles of MurābaÍah36, Musawwamah37 and Tawarruq38.  
 
 
MARKET FEATURES OF BURSA SŪQ AL-SILAÑ 
As an Islamic commodity trading platform for the Islamic financial and capital market, there are 
some information that need to be noticed during the trading of Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ, such as trading 
period, deliverable unit, contract period and expiry, and contract grade and delivery points. The 
comprehensive information provided below is according to the researcher‟s reading.39 
 
As we noticed, Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ is designed to accommodate multi-currency and multi-
commodity which in contract specification, each commodity has its own defined requirement. 
For participants‟ requirement, only qualified participants who registered and approved by BMIS 
can trade in this market. There are 3 different categories of participant; those are Commodity 
                                               
35 See http://bursamalaysia.custhelp.com/app/answers/list/p/12/search/1, accessed on 14th January 2010. 
36 MurābaÍah is a sale and purchase contract which states the buying price of the transaction object, and the profit 
margin mutually agreed by both parties the seller and the buyer. See also Karim, Adiwarman A, opcit., pp.113-118. 
37 Musawamah is a sale where the seller is not obligated to disclose the price paid to create or obtain the good or 
service as he may or may not have full knowledge of the cost of the item being negotiated, they are under no 
obligation to reveal these costs as part of the negotiation process.  This defers from MurābaÍah where a buyer knows 
the cost of the underlying asset. 
38 Tawarruq is a sale of commodity involving three parties, which refers to an arrangement whereby a person who was 
in need of cash bought some commodity for deferred payment. Then, he sold it to another party (not the original seller) 
for cash payment of a lower price. 
39 See http://www.oicexchanges.org/presentations/thirdmeeting/annex14%20AbdulRahman.pdf, accessed on 2nd 
February 2010. 
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Trading Participant (CTP)
40
, Commodity Supplying Participant (CSP)
41
 and Commodity 
Executing Participant (CEP)
42
. 
 
The trading period of Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ only operates during weekdays at office hours, where on 
Monday to Thursday, from 10.30am to 6.00pm, while on Friday, there are two sessions, firstly 
morning session from 10.30am to 12.30pm, and afternoon session from 2.30pm to 6.00pm. 
Latest time for “bid”43 for the day shall be before 5.30pm. 
 
Buyer ought to indicate his intention directly to BMIS (or via broker) or leaves open position 
beyond market closing for the day. However, the delivery date is to be negotiated with 
commodity supplier, assisted by BMIS, which is not earlier than a week from purchase date. 
 
Additionally, all settlement to CSP will be via BMIS as settlement agent. Settlement risks which 
encumbered on both sides will be taken up by BMIS. Anyway, both trading fee and brokerage 
need to be settled every month-end while for delivery, price and delivery process fee are required 
to be settled on spot. As briefly stated above, these are among of the market features of Bursa 
Sūq al-SilaÑ which need to be taken into consideration as well.  
 
TRANSACTIONAL FLOW OF BURSA SŪQ AL-SILAÑ 
In this segment, the researcher will elucidate expansively on the transactional flow of Bursa Sūq 
al-SilaÑ as practiced in Bursa Malaysia Islamic Services Sdn Bhd (BMIS)
44
. In order to trade in 
Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ, its market features need to be looked and understood properly before the 
trading began. 
                                               
40 Commodity Trading Participant (CTP) means a person for the time being admitted as a Participant of BMIS, who 
trades the “Approved Commodity” on the Market. “Approved Commodity” means suitable commodity to be 
transacted on the Market as approved by the SharīÑah committee of SharīÑah advisor of BMIS or any other SharīÑah 
Committee or Council of Board recognized by BMIS 
41 Commodity Supplying Participant (CSP) means a person for the time being admitted as a Participant of BMIS, who 
supplies the Approved Commodity to the CTP on the Market. 
42 Commodity Executing Participant (CEP) means a person carrying on the business of dealing in the Approved 
Commodity on behalf of a CTP or a CSP and for the time being admitted as a Participant of BMIS. 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/products_and_services/islamic_capital_market/BMIS/downloads/BMIS_c
hapter1.pdf, accessed on 3rd March 2010. 
43 “Bid” means a type of order from the CTP as principal or as agent for a Client to purchase an Approved Commodity 
from the CSP. 
44 BMIS operates all Islamic markets businesses and activities initiated under Bursa Malaysia. 
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DIAGRAM 1 
Diagram 1 shows comprehensively the transactional flow of Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ where inevitably 
the operation involves several parties such as CPO suppliers (A, B, C, D, E), brokers, corporate 
customer/Islamic bank, BMIS, and commodity purchaser.  
 
Before we proceed to the elaboration on Diagram 1 the researcher would like to give a brief 
explanation on the commodity delivery. Delivery process fee is borne by the buyer plus x% 
delivery process fee and the total amount of fees will be made known straight away. In order to 
take commodity of the delivery, the buyer ought to indicate to BMIS directly or through Broker 
on purpose, and later, BMIS acknowledges and inform CPO supplier. Buyer proceeds with 
licensing under MPOB. Buyer‟s CPO cert should be endorsed by BMIS. Inevitably, delivery 
document is issued by CPO supplier. Eventually, buyer presents delivery document to CPO 
supplier to take delivery.
45
  
                                               
45 See http://www.oicexchanges.org/presentations/thirdmeeting/annex14%20AbdulRahman.pdf, accessed on 14th 
January 2010. 
Transactional Flow of Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ 
SUPPLIERS 
COMMODITY SELLERS 
(1)Sells RM10 million worth of Crude 
Palm Oil (CPO) warrants “commodity” 
to the Islamic Bank A on spot basis. 
(3)Delivers the commodity on the same 
day and the ownership is transferred to 
the Islamic Bank A. 
 
 
BURSA SUQ AL-SILA' 
(7) Purchases the commodity from the 
Islamic Bank B at RM10 million (purchase 
price) on a spot basis.  
(8) BSAS is a trading and Clearing Engine. 
(9) Sells the commodity to the Suppliers 
back randomly for RM10 million on a spot 
basis. 
 
ISLAMIC BANK 
(2) Buys/Pays RM10 million worth of 
Crude Palm Oil (CPO) warrants 
“commodity” from supplier, on a spot 
basis. 
(4)Sells the commodity to the 
Client/Islamic Bank B at Rm10 
million plus a profit margin 
(MurābaÍah) on deferred payment. 
 
ISLAMIC BANK B 
(5) Purchases the commodity from 
the Islamic Bank A at RM10 
million plus a profit margin 
(MurābaÍah) on deferred payment. 
(6) Sells the commodity to Bursa 
Suq Al-Sila' for RM10 million on a 
spot basis, on the same day. 
 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
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The illustration in Diagram 1 happens when the Islamic Bank A purchases RM10 million worth 
of Crude Palm Oil (CPO) warrants “commodity” from the Supplier, on a spot basis. Later, the 
Supplier delivers the commodity on the same day and the ownership is transferred to the Islamic 
Bank A. Next, the Islamic Bank A sells the said commodity to the Client or Islamic Bank B at 
Rm10 million plus a profit margin (MurābaÍah) on deferred payment. So, the Client or Islamic 
Bank B pays the purchase price on deferred. Thereafter, the Client or Islamic Bank B sells the 
commodity to Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ (BSAS) for RM10 million on a spot basis, on the same day. 
Consequently, BSAS purchases the commodity from the Client or Islamic Bank B at RM10 
million (purchase price) who is a trading and clearing engine of the commodity. Later, BSAS 
sells the commodity to the Suppliers back randomly for RM10 million on a spot basis. Thus, the 
selling of the commodity goes back to the Suppliers randomly.  
 
ANALYSIS ON PERMISSIBILITY OF ITS MARKET 
Bursa Sūq al-SilaÑ, formerly known as Commodity MurābaÍah House, facilitates commodity-
based Islamic financing and investment transactions under the Shari’ah principles of 
MurābaÍah, Tawarruq, Musawamah and Wakālah. 
 
It is submitted that a valid contract is defined as a contract which its essence and attributes (ÒAÎl 
and WaÎf) are in accordance to the Shari’ah and which subsequently has a legal effect of 
enforceability that binds the contracting parties equally.
46
 Therefore, those contracts are 
permissible in SharīÑah which leads to the legality of Commodity MurābaÍah transactional flow. 
Furthermore, there must be contracting parties who have legal capacity besides expressing their 
agreement of offer (ÒÔjāb) and acceptance (Qābūl), where the minds of both parties in bilateral 
contract
47
 must coincide (agree) and the declaration must relate on to the same commodity 
(subject matter/ mahal al-Ñaqd). 
 
                                               
46 Billah, Mohd. Ma‟sum, Modern Financial Transactions under Shari’ah, (Selangor: Ilmiah Publisher, 2003), pp.32. 
47 A bilateral contract requires at least two parties, formally, in which one party shall offer a proposal (Ijab) and the 
other shall accept (Qabul).  
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According to AAOIFI, the commodity sold should be well indentified such as separating the 
commodity from the other assets of the seller, or recording the numbers of its identifying 
documents e.g. storing certificates.
48
  
 
Talking about the subject matter (mahal al-‘aqd) in Commodity MurābaÍah markets, in 
Malaysia basically they use CPO as a common commodity. Apart from CPO, CMH is 
considering the use of metal, charcoal and etc in commodity trading. Obviously, at the time of 
contract, the CPO as traded in Bursa Malaysia exists during the transaction. 
 
FORGONE ISSUES AND POSSIBLE SHARÔÑAH SOLUTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
48 See AAOIFI standard No.30, on Controls on Monetization Transactions, item 4/2, pp.535. See also AAOFII 
standard No.20, on Selling Commodities in Organized markets, item 4/2/2. 
Issues in Commodity MurābaÍah market 
 
Identification of the Commodity  
 
(1) Gharar (uncertainty) in CPO 
(i)CPO in tanks is pumped in and 
pumped out and it is not stagnant.  
(2) Commodity’s price 
(i)Commodity‟s price seems equivalent 
to ribāÒ. 
(ii) MurābaÍah rate as benchmark to 
LIBOR (Inter-bank offered rate in 
London). 
(3) Dilemma in CPO 
(i)CPO derivative eventually turns to 
food products. 
(ii) Reselling non-possessed 
merchandise. 
(4)Expensive fee charged for delivery 
of the commodity. 
 
Execution of Contracts  
 
(1)Being Tawarruq MunaÐÐam 
(Organized Tawarruq) which is synthetic 
and fictitious as BayÑ al-ÑÔnah. 
(2)Wakālah Issues in Commodity 
Murābahah trading. 
(i)The Appointment of the bank as an 
Agent. 
(ii) The trading is exposed to exploitation 
and fraud. 
(iii) A Sale and purchase contract is 
concluded by one party for itself and on 
behalf of the counter party at once. 
 (3) Tri-partite al-ÑÔnah which 
circumvents the prohibition of ribāÒ. 
(4) MurābaÍah and BayÑ al-MuÑajjal 
contracts are deemed as a cover up for 
continuing the present ribāÒ-based 
transaction. 
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(1) Identification of the Commodity 
Briefly speaking, the study regarding the subject matter (mahal al-‘aqd) itself consists three basic 
problems which may lead to the overall impermissibility of the transaction. 
 
 
First:  The issue of Gharar (uncertainty) in the commodity. 
As general International Commodity MurābaÍah is concerned, there is one question in 
determining the traded commodity, e.g. the subject matter (mahal al-‘aqd) of London Metal 
Exchange (LME) has been strongly disputed. It carries element of Gharar (uncertainty), which 
means the commodity itself in the trading is confused as far as their identification is concerned. 
This amounts to jahl (ignorance) whether the commodity was totally sold to one party or might be 
to parties. Obviously the metal is there but we never sure which one is ours and most probably the 
commodity that sold to us is sold to other parties as well.
49
 
 
To conclude such kind of contract is prohibited in SharīÑah since the subject matter of sale is 
unknown. According to Ibn ×azm: 
“Gharar in sale occurs when the purchaser does not know what he has bought and 
the seller does not know what he has sold.”50 
This is supported by Al-Babartī:  
“Gharar happens when the subject matter is unknown.”51 
 
Ibn Qayyim aI-Jawziyya described gharar as being the subject- matter that the vendor is not in a 
position to hand over to the buyer, whether this subject-matter is in existence or not.
52
  
 
                                               
49 The idea is discussed during the researcher‟s interview with Mr. Norfadelizan bin Abdul Rahman, the Head of 
Product Development, Islamic Capital Market of Bursa Malaysia Berhad, who is in charge of developing and 
innovating Shariah-compliant products and infrastructure for the Exchange, on 31st March 2010. 
50 Ibn Hazm, „Ali bin Ahmad, Al-Muhalla, (Beirut: Dar Al-Aafak Al-Hadiyra, 1351 A.H.), 8/343, 389 and 43. 
51 Al-Babarty, Fath-Al-Qadir, 5/192 
52 Saleh, Nabil A., Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar and Islamic Banking, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp.49-50. 
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Any transaction practiced by Islamic financial institution must avoid any element of neither 
gharar nor jahālah (lack of knowledge) as both are deemed either as factors for a contract to be 
void or voidable according to the degree of gharar or jahālah respectively.53  
 
As far as CPO is concerned, the CPO in tanks is pumped in and pumped out and it is not stagnant, 
as it could be considered as BayÑ al-MaūÎūf fī Dhimmah (selling an imaginery object). 
 
The mainstream opinion of the majority of traditional Muslim fuqahas holds that a contract which 
subject matter at the time of conclusion of contract is not-determined is void. To avoid this, during 
the contract, the buyer must barely sure that the commodity is well identified.
54
 
 
In the trading of commodity, the genus, species, type, attributes and quality of sold thing are 
known but the identification of it is unknown then gharar is present and dispute may arise on 
specifying its tagging. This is important since the owner will be responsible for any damage or loss 
to the commodity. Hence, the identification of the owner and his respective commodity is crucial. 
 
But if buyer has the (option to specification), that is the right to choose one of the things and leave 
the others, Mālikis permit it because in their view, this option renders gharar ineffective. While 
ShafiÑī, ×anbalī and Zahiri schools forbid it, and so does ×anafī school when there are more than 
three to choose from, and allows it when there are three or less.
55
 Interestingly, the continuous flow 
of CPO can be remedied by the fact that the manufacturer/ vendor will guarantee the sold portion 
as long as the CPO is still under their custody. 
 
                                               
53 Al-Sanhūrī explains the difference between gharar and jahālah as follows: “Jahālah brings about gharar in the 
following circumstances: jahālah means to sell something which exists but whose quantity is unspecified. Gharar, on 
the other hand, means to sell something whose availability is unknown”. He further mentions that the jurists, however, 
mix up the two terms gharar and jahālah and use them interchangeable. Al-Sanhūrī, Abdul Ar-Razzak Ahmad, The 
Source of Legal Right In The Islamic Jurisprudence (Risk Uncertainty), vol.2, pp.232. See also Bakar, Mohd Daud, 
opcit., pp.17. 
54 See AAOIFI standard No.30, on Controls on Monetization Transactions, item 4/2, pp.535. See also AAOIFI 
standard No.20, on Selling Commodities in Organized markets, item 4/2/2. 
55 Al-Sātī, Abdul Rahim, The Permissible Gharar (Risk) in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence, (Jeddah: King Abdul 
Aziz University, 2003), pp.13. 
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The confusion lies in distinguishing between jahl and gharar. Briefly speaking, gharar is found in 
the nature (ÒaÎl) of contract itself, whereas jahl is not the nature but the condition or wasf of the 
contract that is defective. Another difference between jahl and gharar lies in nature of defect in 
both the contracts. A contract based on jahl is voidable or defective (fasid) but a contract based on 
gharar is null and void (baÏil). Gharar generally affects both the parties to the contract; jahl may 
affect one party only. The jurists do not disagree on the legal position of gharar; it is the 
application of gharar in context of different customs at different places which is controversial.
56
  
 
As regards to the conditions that in order to free from gharar the subject matter must be in 
existence, it should be noted that existence is one thing but ability to deliver the thing is different. 
A bird in the air or a fish in water exists but it cannot surely be delivered. The moon exists but the 
sites in the moon cannot, at the present, be delivered nor can these be possessed by anyone; thus 
the sale and purchase of sites in the moon imply gharar.  
 
Despite this straightforward prohibition, however some of them qualified the result that they have 
apparently reached which permits it due to certain conditions. As Al-Shafi’ī tolerate Gharar in 
case of need (Íajjah) and when, Gharar cannot be averted except with great difficulty. While 
Ibadis
57
 allows Gharar either deals with immaterial, or in case of necessity (Ìarurah).  
 
Ibn Taymiyyah on this matter said that since the evil of gharar is less than ribā, there is a 
compromise or concession (rukhÎah) in the form of need (haraj) to lift the barrier of gharar on 
certain contracts, but with the stipulation that the evil caused by the prohibition on gharar is more 
than the evil of gharar itself.
58
 Imām al-Nawawī and al-Kāsānī share the same opinion as well. 
AI-Kāsānī gives an example of khiyār al-sharÏ (options of condition). He maintains that this 
option is principally prohibited because it contains gharar and that it is against the objective of the 
contract (muqtaÌā Ñalayh). Therefore, it is permissible. The reason for the permission of such a 
                                               
56 Saleh, Nabil A., opcit., pp.122. 
57 The Ibadis were founded by 'Abd Allah ibn-Ibad in Basra in the 680s as a moderate Khariji group opposed to armed 
rebellion and political assassination and willing to live in harmony with other Muslims. The Ibadis are the only 
remnants today of the once powerful Khariji movement, the earliest Muslim sect. Because of their legalism and strict 
moral code they are called "the puritans of the desert". Refer to http://www.angelfire.com/az/rescon/mgcibadi.html, 
accessed in February 2010. 
58 See http://www.myais.fsktm.um.edu.my/.../Some_Issue_Of_Gharar_in_Insurance.pdf, accessed in January 2010. 
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condition is considering the necessity to remove al-ghabn (the decrease or imbalance of the price 
offered compared to the actual price) through consideration and observations.
59
  
 
As metal trading at LME triggers forgoing debate among the Muslim jurists, Bursa Suq Al-Sila' 
uses CPO in the trading. Similarly, as far as Shari’ah is concerned in the trading of CPO, the 
subject matter in the contract must fulfill the following conditions;
60
 Firstly, reasonable knowledge 
(maÑlūm) in its specification (taÑyīn), character (Îifah), and quantum (qadr). Secondly, able to be 
delivered or received (qudrah Ñalā al-taslīm or tasallum), and lastly rightfully owned by the 
offeror. Here, it can be assumed that in the case of local commodity markets such as CPO, there 
should be no difficulty in ensuring the existence of the relevant commodities and the truthfulness 
of the sales. BURSA has taken initiatives to tackle the issue by having a proper tagging and 
recording of the commodity for the identification. 
 
It is learned that, in the trading of CPO in Bursa Sūq Al-SilaÑ as practiced by Bursa Malaysia 
Islamic Services (BMIS), the level of gharar is minimized because for each transaction concluded, 
all data and detail are recorded safely. In addition, the procedure will guarantee the replacement in 
the case of damage or force major as long as physical delivery does not take place. 
 
Second: Commodity’s price. 
First Issue: Commodity’s price seems equivalent to ribāÒ. 
The commodity‟s price in a credit sale may be increased from the price of a cash sale.  Thus, it is 
argued that the increase of price in a credit sale should be treated equivalent to the interest charged 
on a loan, because in both cases an additional amount is charged for the deferment of payment. 
Inevitably, open a back door for ribāÒ in Islamic banks.  
 
Through this procedure (MurābaÍah), an agent approaches a bank, asking it to obtain a 
commodity, and he agrees to pay the bank an agreed-upon profit.
61
 The only feature distinguishing 
                                               
59 AI-Kāsānī, Abū Bakr ibn MasÑ ūd, Kitāb bādā'iÑ al-ÎanāÒiÑ fÊ tartīb al syarāÒÊÑ, (Egypt:, 1910), vol. 5, pp. 171-174. 
60 Sharbīnī, al-Khatīb, Al-iqnā' fī halli alfāz, abī shujā', vol. 2, (Singapore: Maktabah wa Matba'ah Sulayman Mar‟ī, 
n.d.), pp. 2-6. 
61 Eltegani, Abdelgader Ahmed, Islamic Banking: Distribution of Profit (Case Study), (United Kingdom: The British 
Library, 1990 CE), pp.55. 
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it from other kinds of sale is that the seller in MurābaÍah specifically tells the purchaser how much 
cost he has incurred and how much profit he is going to charge in addition to the cost.
62
 This is not 
a back door for ribāÒ as the price is known, agreeable and not revolving compounding as it is in 
ribāÒ. 
 
It is submitted that, any additional price in MurābaÍah transaction is allowable because the profit 
margin is agreed by the contracting parties. The price is fixed upfront and will never increase 
compared to ribāÒ which always revolves and compounds.  
  
Second Issue:  Murābahah rate as benchmark to LIBOR (Inter-bank offered rate in London)  
 MurābaÍah financing by many institutions commonly portray their profit or mark-up on the basis 
of the current interest-rate, mostly using LIBOR as the criterion. This practice which profit based 
on a rate of interest should be forbidden. 
 
MurābaÍah as a mode of finance has been allowed by the Shari’ah scholars with certain 
conditions.
63
 If MurābaÍah transaction fulfills all the conditions, even using the interest rate as a 
benchmark for determining the profit of MurābaÍah does not render the transaction as harām 
because the deal itself does not contain interest.
64
 For instance, to earn a profit through trading in a 
commodity, Islamic banks charges the same rate of profit as interest rate based on borrowing and 
lending interest rate benchmark. The rate of interest has been used only as an indicator or as a 
benchmark. As long as the requirements of a valid contract, its subject matter and other related 
conditions are fulfilled, the transaction is regarded to be valid. 
 
As long as MurābaÍah is based on Islamic principles and fulfills all its necessary requirements, the 
profit rate determined on the basis of the interest rate is permissible. However, the Islamic banks 
should strive for developing their own benchmark, by creating their own inter-bank market based 
on Islamic principles.  
 
                                               
62 Bakar, Mohd Daud, opcit., pp.21. 
63 MuÍammad TaqÊ ÑusmÉnÊ, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, (Karachi: Maktaba Ma‟ariful Qur‟an,1998), pp.105. 
64 Ibid., pp.119. 
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Third : Dilemma in CPO  
First Issue: CPO derivative eventually turns to be food products. 
In CPO trading, the commodity turns to be food stuff at last which is indispensably used by public 
such as cooking oil, soup, et cetera. So, is it permissible to sell the CPO before taking possession 
over it? 
 
Commonly, in the trading of food, there are several Hadīths which are sanctioned by the Holy 
Prophet (saw) about the transaction is to get full possession of the commodity before it is sold to 
another party. 
As said by As-Sanānī: 
لاق ىهسو ّيهع للها ًهص للها لىسز ٌأ:  
"َح ُّ ِعِبَي َلاَف اّياَعَط يَسَتِشا ٍِ َيُّ َناَتْكَي ًَّت( ."ىهسي ِاوز)  
Narrated by (Abū Huraira), Prophet Muhammad (saw) said: 
“If anyone buys grain, he must not sell it till he weights it.” (Reported by 
Muslim)
65
 
  
Here we noticed that any trading which deals with food stuff requires qabaÌ first before we can 
simply have the right to sell the item to the third party.  
 
If that is so, in CPO trading, we are obliged to qabaÌ the commodity first before deal with any 
transaction. The requirement to take possession is prior than to sell it. Therefore, it is permissible 
to trade the commodity after the possession of the item. 
   
Second Issue: Reselling non-possessed merchandise.  
Can we simply sell any commodity which is not yet possessed or even finished the payment? 
Briefly speaking, there will be two different contract applied in the transaction. First Ñaqad is 
when the customer buys the commodity with the deferred payment, and second Ñaqad is when 
the customer appoints the bank to resell the commodity to the Broker B (third party). One may 
argue that there will be an element of excessive risk and uncertainty when the transaction is 
                                               
65 Al-Sanānī, Muhammad bin Ismail, Bulugh al-maram. Attainment of the Objective According to Evidence of the 
Ordinance. compiled by Al-Asqalani, Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar, 1st ed., (Saudi: Dar Al-Salam Publications, 1996), pp.665. 
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combined or not separated. The transaction of ownership is not actually done between parties, 
the bank and the customer. In other words, the possession of the commodity by the customer is 
not really happen.  
 
The Muslim scholars decide that the resale a movable or an immovable object before receipt is 
forbidden. ×anafis ruled unanimously that it is not valid to resell a movable object of sale before 
receipt. Muhammad, Zufar and Al-ShafiÑī ruled that it is not valid to sell an immovable property 
prior to receiving it due to the generality of the Hadith's prohibition of selling what has not been 
received, the inability to deliver the object of sale and the existence of excessive risk and 
uncertainty.
66
 
 
Besides, the commodity sold to the purchaser has become his property since the contrast has been 
concluded, even though the payment is not completed. As a result the AAOIFI implies that 
Tawarruq is allowed because the purchaser has the right to deal with the property (taÎarruf) 
according to his own discretion or diplomacy, as Islam allows private ownership of property, as 
Allah S.W.T mentioned in Al-Qur‟ān Al-Karīm67.  
 
Ownership rights implies both rights to dispose and to utilize the commodity as pleased by the 
owner compliant with SharīÑah principle. Therefore, in Commodity MurābaÍah market, the 
trading of the commodity with margin profit to the other party is permissible although the payment 
of the commodity for the first party is not completed yet because in trading (al-BayÑ) activities, 
Islamic laws of contracts require the seller to be the legal owner of the tradable property.  
 
Forth:  Expensive fee charged for delivery of the commodity. 
Initially, Bursa charges an expensive fee for the delivery of the commodity to its buyer. This is 
probably deemed as a mean of discourage taking delivery the commodity sold to the buyer as 
Bursa will buy the commodity and sell it back to the suppliers listed randomly. This is also a 
justification to avoid arbitrage. However, this is understood that this charge will be revised from 
time to time. 
                                               
66 Al-Zuhayli, Wahbah, Financial Transactions in Islamic Jurisprudence,  pp.60-61. 
67 Al-Qurān Al-Karīm, Al-Nisaa‟ (4):32. 
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(2) Execution of Contract 
Another important aspect worth looking at, is the models of executing the whole transaction. 
 
First:  Being Tawarruq MunaÐÐam or Tawarruq MaÎrafī (Organized Tawarruq) 
transaction as claimed by many scholars in the trading of Commodity MurābaÍah market. 
Tawarruq MunaÐÐam or Tawarruq MaÎrafī (Organized Tawarruq) which is prohibited because it 
is deemed to be synthetic and fictitious transaction similar to BayÑ al-ÑÔnah which is criticized as a 
legal trick to circumvent the prohibition of ribāÒ. 
 
In this particular Tawarruq transaction, the additional feature of “pre-arranged” MurābaÍah sale 
resembles an “organized financial intermediation” that generates profits to the Bank, which, is 
frowned upon by some as a form of legal trick (Íīlah). This particular issue has been discussed 
previously in SharīÑah Principles Underpinning Commodity Murābahah. However, let‟s give a 
quick look on a brief judgment towards the fiery debates among both traditional and contemporary 
Muslim jurists regarding this concern.  
 
In general, Tawarruq contract which have been applied broadly in Commodity MurābaÍah is valid 
according to Fiqh Academy recent fatwā, in September 1998, particularly in its 15th session of 
conference and the AAOIFI.  
 
In spite of the rejection and disputation of many jurists
68
 towards Organized Tawarruq
69
, some of 
the contemporary scholars
70
 have approved this practice even if it is used in conjunction with an 
                                               
68 Some of the classical jurists, such as, „Umar ibn Abd al-„Aziz and Muhammad al Shaybani chose to discourage 
(karāhah) the practice of Tawarruq. While Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Qayyim decided to prohibit the practice and 
dismissed it as a legal trick (Íīyal) which is similar with BayÑ al-‘Ônah. So does Majlis MajmaÑ al-Fiqh al-Islāmī who 
rejected Tawarruq MaÎrafī.  
69 Tawarruq MaÎrafī (Organized Tawarruq) which is disallowed since it is considered to be synthetic and fictitious as 
BayÑ al-ÑÔnah.  
70 Such as the leading Saudi jurists, Syeikh Abdullah ibn Sulayman al-Mani‟, Dr. Musa Adam Isa, Dr. Usamah Bahr 
and Dr. Sulaiman Nasir al-Ulwan. Indeed, Syeikh Abdullah ibn Sulayman al-Mani‟ considered Tawarruq as a suitable 
solution to overcome the problem of liquidity shortage in a compliant manner. See also Ali, E. R. A. E., opcit., pp.144 
and Mani‟, „Abd Allah ibn Sulaiman, opcit., pp.579-582. 
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organised financing or investment facility offered by an Islamic financial institution.
71
 To avoid 
this prohibition, the whole transactions must be according to proper sequences of taking possession 
as well as making offer and acceptance by the customers to conclude the deals. The commodities 
must not go back to the first vendor. The end buyer should also not be related to the first vendor 
where the bank purchased commodity from, in the first place. 
 
Thus, after retting through all the said judgments above, the reader could possibly get a clear 
picture on the permissibility of transactional flow of Commodity MurābaÍah market. In addition, 
Tawarruq transaction is ÎaÍ (valid) moreover if the parties involved therein fulfill their contractual 
duties as clearly in SharīÑah.72  
 
Second: Wakālah Issues in Commodity MurābaÍah trading. 
First Issue: The Appointment of the bank as an Agent. 
The scenario in CPO trading is that the customer would appoint the Bank as his agent under the 
contract of Wakālah to act on his behalf to sell the commodity to third party identified by the Bank 
on cash basis. The appointment of seller (bank) to be the agent of sale (Wakālah) in Tawarruq 
transaction had been discussed and justified by some Muslim scholars.  
 
Many others like Sheikh Syubaylī in his fatwa said that the appointment of the seller (bank) as the 
agent to sell to the third party is considered as forbidden. He divides Tawarruq in two categories 
which are al-Tawarruq al-JāÒiz (Permissible Tawarruq)73 and Tawarruq al-Muharrām (Prohibited 
Tawarruq)
74
.  
 
                                               
71 Such idea has been discussed earlier in Chapter 2. Moreover, according to Mr. Norfadelizan, Tawarruq MunaÐÐam 
or Tawarruq MaÎrafī (Organized Tawarruq) as prohibited by some Muslim jurists is valid because neither in the Holy 
Al-Qur‟ān nor in the Sunnah has stated the prohibition of such transaction. 
72 Al-Qur‟ān Al-Karīm, Al-Māidah (5):1, Al-Isrā‟ (17):34, and Al-Nisā‟ (4):29. 
73 Permissible Tawarruq is when a customer buys a commodity in deferred payment and sells the commodity after the 
possession of the asset by cash to the third party. See http://www.shubily.com/index.php?news=131, accessed on 25th 
December 2009. 
74Prohibited Tawarruq is when the customer buys an asset with deferred payment and appoints the seller as his agent 
by cash payment without the possession of the commodity. See http://www.shubily.com/index.php?news=131, 
accessed on 25th December 2009. 
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The AAOIFI proposes that it is disallowed if the commodity sold is sold back to the (same) 
institution itself or to a holding institution of the seller institution with complete or majority 
ownership, or with effective control, amounts to a buy-back sale (ÑÔnah).
75
 Yet, if it happens to be 
so, Bursa will sell it back randomly to the suppliers. 
 
Second Issue:  The trading is exposed to exploitation and fraud. 
Simultaneous transactions occur between the financier and the mustawriq for it is considered a 
deception, i.e. heedless to get additional quick cash from the contract, it enclose with a dubious 
transaction. The trading of CPO is exposed to exploitation and fraud (Tadlīs, Taghrīr, Khilābah). 
 
Lately in April 2009, the 19
th
 session of Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) Islamic Fiqh 
Academy conference, in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates has banned this application due to the 
consideration of deception. Furthermore, it is sanctioned by the saying of Allah (swt)
76
 that there is 
a strict warning to those who cheat in transaction. Consequently, in the resolution, OIC Islamic 
Fiqh Academy delineates that Islamic financial institution should have avoid the instrument as it 
deviates from the true objective of SharīÑah. Hence the biggest question posed indirectly by the 
resolution is how many of those so-called Islamic finance practitioners are sincerely willing to 
wear the title of genuine traders in their activities, and not as money-lenders in disguise.  
 
In transactional flow of Tawarruq trading, each commodity sold is given with specific information 
in detail which written in black-and-white document. Hence, commodity MurābaÍah is permitted 
in Islam. As authorized by the Prophet (saw): 
 
 
 
 
                                               
75 Kindly refer to AAOIFI standard No. 20, on the Sale of Commodities in Organised Markets, item 4/2/6, pp.366. See 
also AAOIFI standard No.8, regarding MurābaÍah for the Purchased Ordered, and item 2/2/4 of AAOIFI standard 
No.11, on IstiÎnaÑ and Parallel IstiÎnaÑ. 
76 Al-Qur‟ān Al-Karīm, Al-MuÏaffifiin (83):1. 
25 
 
ٍع وازح ٍب ىيكح ٍع لاق ىهسو ّيهع للها ًهص بىُنا : ٌإف اقسفتي لم اي زايلخاب ٌاعّيبنا
اًهعيب ةكسب تقمح ابّركو اًتك ٌإو ،اًهعيب في اًله كزىب اُيبو اقدص.  
“Narrated by Hakim bin Hizam (r) the Prophet (saw) said: the buyer and the seller 
have the option to cancel or confirm the deal as long as they have not parted or till 
they part, and if they spoke the truth and told each other the defects of the things, 
then blessings would be on their deal, and if they hid something and told lies, the 
blessing of the deal would be lost.” (Bukhari) 
 
Furthermore, the Securities Commission has been entrusted with particular duties and 
responsibilities; one of them is as having to monitor and supervise the activities of any exchange, 
clearing house and central depository, and to safeguard the interest of those dealing in securities 
and the trading of future contracts.
77
 Besides, the SC is required to check on any illegal and 
improper conduct or practice in securities dealing. Thus, it is within the SC‟s jurisdiction to reform 
the regulations of the law relating to the securities and futures contracts
78
 as well as of the 
regulations of any exchange and its clearing house. Moreover, in order to uphold harmony in any 
transaction, The Holy Prophet (saw) reminds us that: 
 عىيبنا في عديخ َّا ىهسو ّيهع للها ًهص بيُهن سكذ لاجز ٌأ ،سًع ٍب للها دبع ٍع
ةبلاخ لا مقف تعياب اذإ لاقف.  
“Narrated by Abdullah Ibn Umar (r), a person came to the Prophet (saw) and told 
him that he was always betrayed in purchasing. The Prophet (saw) told him to say 
at the time of buying “No Cheating”. (Bukhari) 
 
From both the Qur‟ānic and Hadīth sanctioned as well as the practice of companions79, we can 
ponder that in Commodity MurābaÍah, the Tawarruq transaction itself must be cleaned from any 
fraud or misappropriates or else the transaction itself is forbidden in SharīÑah. 
 
 
                                               
77 Goh, Chen Chuan, opcit.,, pp.58. 
78 The problem with future contracts is that "goods" are sold before they are owned by the respective party. The basic 
general SharīÑah rule regarding sale is that you must own first only afterward you can sell. 
79 It sanctions by the saying and practice of companions: “ رماع نب ةبقع لاقو :بي ئرملا لحي لاهربخأ لاإ ًءاد اهب نأ ملعي ةعلس عي ” 
Translation: Uqbah bin „Amar (r) said, it is illegal for one to sell a thing if one knows that it has a defect unless one 
informs the buyer of the defect. Refer to Bukhārī, Muhammad bin IsmāÑīl, ØaÍīÍ Bukharī, vol.3, p.166. 
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Third Issue: A Sale and purchase contract is concluded by one party for itself and on 
behalf of the counter party at once.  
 
The SharīÑah issue may arise when the account is not being separated between the customer and 
the bank. If the separation of account is not being done by the bank (as the bank acts as two 
entities), they may involve in fictitious transaction, give the guaranty on itself or Wakālah Ñalā 
Nafsihi. If the bank appoints the customer (Mutawarriq) as its agent to purchase the commodity on 
its behalf and then to sell the same to himself, the transaction will not be valid, as the two 
transactions of purchase and sale are interdependent and the bank has not taken the possession and 
the business risk. However if the bank appoints him as an agent only for the purchase of a 
commodity on behalf of the bank, then, once it is purchased ; the bank itself sells it to him through 
a separate contract with proper offer and acceptance, the transaction is valid.
80
 
 
Third : Tri-partite al-ÑÔnah which circumvents the prohibition of ribāÒ. 
It is argued here that Commodity MurābaÍah which applied the form of Organised Tawarruq 
resembles to tri-partite al-ÑÔnah, which is frowned upon by some as a form of Íīlah (legal trick). 
 
However, the question of Commodities MurābaÍah transaction deviates from the true objective of 
SharīÑah and contains the element of ribāÒ in trading activities is irrelevant because the said 
transaction does not inflict any legal effect on the sale of contract as the nature of profit is agreed 
upon in the contract by both parties. 
 
As argued on the issue of Íiyāl, Hanafis and Shafi‟īs schools generally approve the use of Íiyāl (a 
plural for Íīlah) as long as it does not deny the rights of people or involve falsehood (baÏil) or even 
demeaning the religion.
81
 Moreover, here in Malaysia, the Malaysian scholars argue that not all 
Íīlah is rejected, e.g. the SharīÑah Advisory Council (SAC) of the Central Bank of Malaysia 
argued that Íīlah as evident in the practice of Islamic instruments in Islamic Inter-bank Money 
Market (IIMM), which is considered as a mode to solve problems (makhraj) that is much needed 
by the people, as well as to avoid any abuse of such contract which may lead to dispute or 
                                               
80  See also AAOIFI standard no 20, 4/1/3 on trading of commodities.    
81 Asyraf, Wajdi Dusuki, opcit., pp.11. 
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injustice, necessary conditions are attached. Thus, Commodity MurābaÍah which extensively 
practices Tawarruq is allowed and to avoid tri-partite ÑÔnah, the commodity should not be sold 
back to the first buyer from whom the commodity is sold. 
 
 
Forth:  MurābaÍah and BayÑ al-MuÑajjal contracts are deemed as a cover up for 
continuing the present ribāÒ-based transaction.  
The mark up tends to be higher, the longer the period of time involved. By this way, the banks will 
have the guarantee of receiving back the price they actually pay plus a predetermined return as the 
result of the mark up. 
 
Indeed, the client is not obliged to accept the commodity which has been bought for him. As a 
result, the banks may lose if the price of the rejected commodity falls. The banks always face this 
risk. Thus, in Commodity MurābaÍah transaction which uses several contracts such as 
MurābaÍah, BayÑ al-MuÑajjal and Tawarruq is valid according to the SharīÑah. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
As presented, among the SharīÑah issues are identifications of the commodity, taking ownership 
prior to sell, charging expensive fee for delivery of the commodity and being the artificial fancy 
contract to get liquidity. The Commodity MurābaÍah programme as offered by Bursa Malaysia is 
a distinctive device in its structures especially to cater the identified SharīÑah issues. It is a 
breakthrough and a good example of innovation of alternative products vis a vis conventional 
banking and finance. Those SharīÑah issues according to some standards are tolerable. Whereas, 
according to other jurisdictions, stricter requirements are imposed. It is submitted that Bursa 
Malaysia will reconsider and review from time to time their standards operations, business 
operation model and subject matter of the contracts as per demanded by the industry. Hence 
SharīÑah Advisory Committee of each Islamic financial institution plays important role to improve 
the transactions from time to time. It seems that Bursa always welcomes those suggestions and 
criticisms. This positive stance will actually attract Islamic financial institutions from around the 
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global to do their commodity transactions.  Definitely, some of the SharīÑah issues such as being 
fictitious or (Organized Tawarruq) can be resolved and avoided by the respective financial 
institutions. For example, they may not allow bank to become the customer‟s agent in concluding 
the transaction on behalf of the customer and at the same time on behalf of itself as the counter 
party. It must be concluded by the customer himself at least via teleconference. Likewise they may 
also ensure that the end buyer who will buy the commodity from the customer is not the vendor of 
the commodity who sold the commodity to the bank. Any controversial issues related to the 
transactions which might affect the legality of the contract from SharīÑah perspective should be 
avoided.  
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